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JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE
While it is fundamental to our polity that law enforcers may not themselves
disregard the law, the widespread practice of illegal search has long suggested
that both police and public are of a different persuasion. As with the related
investigative illegalities of wiretapping, 2 false arrest,8 and the third degree,4
1. The great number of cases involving illegal search and seizure is some indication
of its broad incidence. See CORNELIUS, SEARCH AND SEIzuRE 2 (2d ed. 1930) ; LASSO4,
THE FouRTH AMENDMENT 106 (1937). In fact, there appear to be so many incidents of
illegal search that even though many are not recorded the practice is common knowledge,
See statement of Senator Dunnigan in 1 Naw YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,
REVISED RECoRD 365 (1938).
2. For a collection of some known and some surmised data on the practice, see Wire-
tapping, Congress, and the Department of Justice, 9 INT'L JURiD. Ass'N BULL. 97 (1941).
The law of wiretapping, which since Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) has
been technically distinguished from other kinds of search, is treated in GREENMAN, WIRE-
TAPPING: ITS RELATION TO CIVIL LIBERTIES (1938) and Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire-
tapping, 32 CORN. L.Q. 514 (1947) and 33 CORN. L.Q. 73 (1947).
3. HOPKINS, OUR LAWLESS POLICE 61-99 (1931); WILLEMSE, BEHIND TE GREEN
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the common incidence of illegal search and seizure indicates more than the
normal divergence between theory and practice. Rather it evidences a popular
belief that crime is a necessary and therefore justifiable weapon in the fight
against crimeY
Particularly when they are dealing with known criminals, or the "criminal
classes," police and prosecutors tend to regard lawless methods as justifiable.
For the average policeman the community tends to become divided into good
men and bad men; the "good" men are the more respectable elements, and
the "bad" men are not only the known criminals but the "suspicious charac-
ters," the vagrants, and the members of unpopular minority groups. For these
groups, constitutional privileges are deemed waived in varying degrees, de-
pending on the disfavor with which the policeman views the suspect.0 The
LIGHTS (1931) passim; Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to Contcnporary Social
Problems, 3 U. OF CHL L. REv. 345, 362 (1936) ; Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law,
24 CoaxN. L. Q. 337, 338 (1939). Professor Hall, supra, concluded that approximately
one out of three persons arrested was released without being brought before any judicial
officer, and that in the year 1933 there were roughly 3,500,000 illegal arrests in the United
States.
4. NATIONAL. CommIssIozz ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND EzroncnNT, RinW-ro o.
LAXv.zssNEss nx LAW ExFORcmramT 13-263 (1931); BAnINEs A-:- TEETE , Xr.%,- Ho:.-
zoNs IN CMnMnoo 'Y 274- (1943) ; WVmu..asr, op. cit. supra note 3, possim. The report
of the national commission (Wickersham Commission), supra, is severely criticized by
Professor Waite in Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcemnent: Comment, 30 Mien. L
REv. 54 (1931), as relying on inadequate data and probably exaggerating the incidence of
illegalities. The unabashed confessions of ex-police captain Willemse, snspra, however, sug-
gest that the Commission's estimates were conservative.
5. "Some kinds of lawless enforcement of law like the 'third degree' or searches and
seizures without the warrants required by law, appear to result from a definite official
policy favoring habitual disregard of particular legal rules. The remedy for an abuse of
this sort involves the serious difficulty of altering rooted official habits." NATIONAL Com-
mIssIOx ON LAW OBS.RVAcXE AND EXFoRcE EnT, op. cit. supra note 4, 340. Ho~rKs, OP.
cit. supra note 3, at 47, quotes a Buffalo police official: "My oath of office rcquires me to
protect this community. If I have to violate that oath of office or violate the Constitution,
I'll violate the Constitution. Nobody thinks of hedging a fireman about with a 16t uf laws
that favor the fire. Crime is as dangerous as fire, and the policeman and the fireman should
be equally free." And see id. at 314-323.
Apart from these beliefs, policemen may tend to disregard the law simply for the sahe
of convenience, or because of preconceived theories as to the suspect, or because of pro-
fessional jealousy and the need for speed. See Kooken, Post War Influence Upon Criminal
Investigation, 35 J. Cpam. L. & CluInxiOLoGy 426 (1945).
6. HoPKINs, op. cit. supra note 3, at 321, 327-31; Wnxx sE, op. cit. supra note 3, at
30-1. Police treatment of aliens, especially, has been characterized by mass illegal arrests,
searches and seizures. See NATIONAL CommssioN oN LAW OnsrvANCE AND E-wFo CE-
NZENT, PY-.ORT ON THE ENFORCEMENr OF THE DEPORTATION LAWS OF TI UNITED STATES
55, 133-7 (1931). Although it was stated that shortly after the Commission's report mass
raids were discontinued, Kane, The Challenge of the lWickersham Deportations Report, 23
J. CmL L. & C~irmxoLooy 575, 583 (1932), the practice of dispensing with the formalities
when dealing with Chinese and other aliens appears to be still not unknown in New York
City.
Compare Hall, supra note 3, at 368-9, as to illegal arrests: "Every large city has thou-
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prosecutor, whose record of convictions is his political opportunity, may be
tempted to adopt the same attitude, albeit sometimes in a more sophisticated
form.7
Police lawlessness excused as expediency has been encouraged by apathy
and occasional affirmative support both from the public and its elected leaders.8
Defendants are to a large extent protected, for statutes generally provide that
civil servants' salaries cannot be garnished in the event of civil suit,0 and
policemen are frequently indemnified from loss 0 and defended without cost.1
But the wronged plaintiff, who is likely to be both ignorant and poor, receives
little or no help from the public, 12 and must usually proceed alone for whatever
sands of homeless, unemployed men and women who persist in getting into the way of
police officers. The police operation is one of very superficial prophylaxis-an overnight
removal of these unsightly elements from the city streets. The utter impotence of this class
of arrestees is ample guarantee that they will not employ attorneys or otherwise annoy the
police."
7. "Under our legal system the way of the prosecutor is hard, and the need of 'getting
results' puts pressure upon prosecutors to use the 'third degree,' to suppress evidence, to
bulldoze witnesses, and generally to indulge in the lawless enforcement of the law which
produces a vicious circle of disrespect for law. Yet in causes involving few possibilities of
publicity they may be perfunctory and supine, with no check upon the resulting inefliciency."
POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 186 (1930). And see FRANK, IF MEN WEan
ANGELS- 32 (1942) ; TRAIN, FROM THE DIsTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 116-137 (1939).
8. See, e.g.: remarks of Representative Fish in 1 NEw YORK STATE CONSTrTUTONAL
CONVENTION, REsVIED RECORD 562-5 (1938). And see Vanderbilt, Message to the Bill of
Rights Review, 1 BILL OF RIGHTS REV. 41, 42 (1940) : "The individual whose constitutional
rights are assailed is generally a member of an unpopular minority, for in a democracy the
politicians do not often strike at majorities. . . . The social pressure that is likely to
hamper the individual lawyer in this field is intensified in the case of our law enforcing
officers, for generally they are active in politics, and subject, therefore, to the pressures of
politics."
The attitude of the public may vary from hearty approbation of police lawlessness
coupled with active viligantism, to strong protest, depending to some extent on the popu-
larity of the victims. See CAm, FEDERAL PRoTcrION OF CIVIL RIGHTS 14-22 (1947).
Perhaps the most thoroughly organized public participation in illegal investigative work
recorded was that of the American Protective League in the First World War. See, for a
eulogistic history of the A.P.L., HoUGH, THE WEB (1919) and for brief criticism, see
Black, Burdean v. McDowall: A Judicial Milepost on the Road to Absolutism, 12 B. U. L.
REv. 32, 38-9 (1932).
Most usually, perhaps, insistence on results and apathy or ignorance as to means is
characteristic of public opinion. Thus: "Recent gangster murders having caused an outcry
for police activity, two thousand luckless unemployed had to serve as convenient cell-
fodder." HOPKINS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 50. And see generally id. at 50-60.
9. The state rules and cases are collected in 6 McQuiLLix, LAW OF MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATiONS § 2681 (2d ed. 1928).
10. 2 McQuILLIN, LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 532 (Rev. ed. 1939). It is the
general rule that a municipal officer may be reimbused even where he has exceeded his au-
thority or committed an illegal act, provided the act is related to his proper duties,
11. CORNELIUS, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 45.
12. With the exception of the aid that may be provided by organizations such as the
Civil Liberties Union.
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damages he can collect.' 3 Chief executives of municipalities, states, and the
nation itself have aided in the handicapping process by their reluctance to de-
mand prosecution of offending officers,14 and in some cases are themselves
responsible for policies of wholesale illegality.'0
In the unique area of lawless enforcement of the law, the neglect, if not the
adverse interest, of the normal prosecuting agencies and the public leaves the
courts alone to intervene. Since the normal law enforcement agencies are
themselves the law-breakers, control of this kind of crime is peculiarly diffi-
cult and also doubly important.' 0
Although the judiciary in general has recognized and accepted its responsi-
bility,'" at least to the extent of repeated denunciations of police lawlessness,' 8
13. Municipalities, like states, are generally not liable in tort, so that "... . ,vhere
there is liability (as in the case of a policeman), the fact of financial irresponsibility is op-
erative and, presumably, conclusive; while, where financial responsibility exists (as in the
case of a city), there is no liability." Hall, supra note 3, at 348. The most effective po-
tential step toward municipal liability, the filing of official bonds, has had only limited
coverage and effect. Id. at 349-52.
Nor does it appear that the federal government will be held liable under the Federal
Torts Claims Act. See note 36 infra.
14. The chief executive or police chief may, with some reason, prefer to discipline
rather than to prosecute police. But, as with instances of illegal arrest, see NATIONAL
Co-mmIssIoN ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEmIENT, REPOr o: Cr ni mAL PaccEDuna
19 (1931), it is not everyone who has the influence to cause him to do so, or even to bring
the matter to his attention. The down-and-outer can hardly afford even to complain, for
fear of police retribution. See HoPmIINS, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 90.
15. See, e.g.: orders of Commissioner of Police Mulrooney and Mayor Walker of Neew
York City and description of incidents that followed in HoPKINs, op. cit. supra note 3, at
45; statement of findings of the district court in Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 495, 504-6
(1939) ; NATIONAL POPULAR GOVERNMENT LEAGUE , E.PORT UPON THI- ILLEGAL Pn.Ic-rcFs
OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMSENT OF JUSTICE 44-54 (1920).
16. Contrast the statement of Thomas E. Dewey in 1 Nz%,nw Yonn STATE CoN lsTru-
TIOxAL CovE-rvNox: REviSED RECORD 373 (1938) : "This bill [authorizing wire-tapping]
is founded on the theory that public officials may be trusted to do their duty. Any other
theory asserts that democracy is a failure. I do not believe that democracy is a failure."
The essential choice seems to be between two points of view: the point of view of
the typical court, and that of the typical prosecutor. The one opinion asserts the need
of checks and balances, especially where civil rights are concerned, the other asserts the
need for a free administrative hand. See, generally, FRANx, op. cit. supra note 7, at 316-
331, POUND, op. cit. supra note 7, at 54, 57, 59.
17. There have been certain exceptions, particularly in the lower courts. An example
of police-court lawlessness is afforded by the conduct of the New York magistrate's
courts prior to the Seabury investigation, when both police and police courts were the
agents of politics rather than lax. See FINAl REPORT OF SAm1umi_ SE AUmY, RzFIrr,
IN THE MATTER OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE AGISTRATES' COUTS iAND THE: MAGIS-
TRATEs THEREOF, AND OF ATTORNEYS-AT-LA.W PRAcTicuG n; SAID COuTMs (N.Y. Sup.
Ct., App. Div., 1st Jud. Dept. 1932); MacKaye, The House That Justice Built, quoted in
MOLEx, TrmuNEs OF THE PEOPLE 12-1 (1932). Such instances of nonfeasance or mal-
feasance in police courts are particularly vicious in that the usual victims of police law-
lessness seldom have the means to appeal. "No court has a more direct influence for
good or evil, [than a police court] or for a creation of a respect or a disregard for the
19481
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the adjudicative nature of a court's power'limits its attempt to control police
illegalities by a sanction more forceful than moral suasion 1 9 Though it may
have full knowledge of the prevalence of illegal activity, courts as presently
constituted are helpless to act until the parties appear and the issues are
placed before it. Thus where police, neither intending nor undertaking to
prosecute, take the law in their own hands for purposes of harassment, threat,
or revenge,20 the courts have no means of control at all. Only as to illegalities
incident to prosecution have the courts been able to devise a governor for the
machine of law enforcement.
The device consists simply in judicial nullification of the illegal act by a
refusal to allow it to aid the prosecution. Although subsequently applied in
the related fields of illegal detention 2 ' and wire-tapping,22 and applied or sug-
law. For an overwhelming majority of our citizens, particularly those of foreign birth
or extraction, it is the only court of justice in existence." TRAIN, op. cit. supra note 7,
at 40.
18. "The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain
conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions . . .should find no
sanction in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support
of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the
maintenance of such fundamental rights." Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392
(1914). ". . . there appears to be a growing public sentiment against the observance of
or obedience to any constitutional restraint that obstructs or stands in the way of the
desires of those who seek to accomplish their purposes regardless of constitution or laws.
." Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152, 156, 224 S.W. 860, 861 (1920).
19. See, as to arrest, Hall, supra note 3, at 345-6.
20. "There's plenty of law at the end of a nightstick." Thus Commissioner Whalen
of New York summed up the spirit of this sort of extra-judicial control of the populace
by the police. Quoted in HopIINS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 49. And see id. at 90, 94;
WILLEmSE, op. cit. mipra note 3, at 40.
21. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) and Anderson v. United States,
318 U.S. 350 (1943) (illegal detention tainted confessions so as to make their admission
reversible error per se), reversing previous doctrine that illegalities in the procurement
of a confession, if it were "voluntarily" made, were relevant only in a civil action against
the officials. People v. Mummiana, 258 N.Y. 394, 180 N.E. 94 (1932). The McNabb
rule was shortly afterwards somewhat modified, however, Comment, 53 YALE L. J. 758
(1944), so that it is still uncertain whether the courts will exclude on mere showing of
illegality where there is no doubt as to voluntariness. Strong reassertion of the McNabb
rule is, however, provided in the recent holding in In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453 (2d Cir.
1947) cerl. granted, 331 U.S. 804, which for the first time remanded a case because the
lower court had failed to make a finding prior to indictment on the legality of the means
by which a confession was secured. The court based its decision on the analogy to the
exclusionary rule in search and seizures. The court declared: "The courts refuse to
receive in evidence an unlawfully acquired confession, not because of its presumptive
untruthfulness or unreliability or because it is irrelevant, but because of the illegality
of the means by which it was acquired." Id. at 458. See Note, 38 J. CluM. L. AND
CRIMINOLOGY 509 (1948).
The similarity between the McNabb rule and the search and seizures rule was in a
sense foreseen over 40 years ago, when the upstart rule of exclusion following illegal
[Vol. 58:' 144
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gested in a variety of other fields,23 the nullification principle was first enunci-
search was criticized as being contrary to the well accepted, pre-M,\abb principle of
the admissibility of illegally secured confessions. Note, 4 Cor. L. RLv. 60 (1904).
22. Nardone v. United States, 30S U.S. 33S (1939). Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438 (1927) had held, over the eloquent dissents of Justices Brandeis and Holmes, that
wiretapping did not constitute an unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, and that the exclusionary rule did not apply. Although the Aardone opinion
did not reverse the previous holding as to the status of wiretapping under the Fourth
Amendment, it did hold that the exclusionary rule could be invoked on the ground that the
tap was illegal under the newly enacted § 605 of the Federal Communications Act. See
sources cited supra note 2.
23. Illegal Arrest: Almost universally, courts have allowed prosecution in spite of
illegal arrest or illegal rendition across state lines. See Plumb, supra note 3, at 340, n.
Defense attorneys, however, still suggest the extension of the exclusionary principle to
this type of investigative illegality. See Rose v. McKeon, 190 Misc. 932, 76 N.Y.S.2d 391
(Sup. Ct. 1948).
Detectaphones: In Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) the Court relied
on Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), holding that use of detectaphones,
like wire taps, was not repugnant to the Fourth Amendment, but that, unlike wiretapping,
it as not subject to § 605 of the Federal Communications Act. There had Leen a previ-
ous illegal entry to install a dictaphone which, however, failed to work. Had it been used,
the Court suggested ".... it might, with reason, be claimed that the continuing trespass
was the concomitant of its use." 316 U.S. at 134-5. But a detectaphone, unlike a dicta-
phone, can be-and was here-installed outside the room under investigation, and no
"trespass" resulted. The lower court had likened it to "... . the use of a common aid to
hearing by a person somewhat deaf." United States v. Goldman, 118 F2d 310, 314 (2d
Cir. 1941). The court therefore refused to exclude evidence obtained by use of the
detectaphone. Mr. Justice Murphy dissented on the ground that here was an unreason-
able search, observing: "It is strange doctrine that keeps inviolate the most mundane
observations entrusted to the permanence of paper but allows the revelation of thoughts
uttered within the sanctity of private quarters. . . ." 316 U.S. at 141.
Entrapment: In Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932) the lower court ruled
as a matter of law that there was no entrapment. The Supreme Court reversed, but with
a fundamental disagreement among the concurring justices as to the nature of the defense
of entrapment. Five Justices declared that the defense constituted a denial of the com-
mission of the crime, and that therefore the question should go to the jury on the general
issue. Justices Roberts, Brandeis and Stone, however, urged the discharge of the defend-
ant on the ground that entrapment Nwas properly considered a plea in bar:". . . the courts
must be closed to the trial of a crime instigated by the Government's own agents:' Id. at
459. In other words, illegality on the part of government agents, once proved, should
cause the release of the defendant, though he had committed the crime. See Kent, Note,
The Nature of the Defense of Entrapment, 1 U. oF Cui. L. REV. 115 (1933).
Miscellanwous: See Churn v. State, 184 Tenn. 646, 202 SMW. 2d 345 (1947), 47
CoL. L. REv. 1380 (evidence excluded on the sole ground that during an otherwise legal
search officials had committed a minor assault on the accused); But cf. Stasney v. State,
208 SAV.2d 894 (Ct. Crim. App. Tex. 1943) (officer's testimony as to defendant's
drunkenness not inadmissible simply because of illegalities in the detention of the accused).
But cf. Ia re Wallace & Tiernan Co. Inc., 76 F. Supp. 215 (D.R.I. 1948) (grand jury at
whose instance subpoenas were issued was illegally constituted; held, evidence secured by
the subpoena must be returned and v.as inadmissible).
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ated in a search and seizure case.24 It remains today the sole instrumentality
of the courts for maintaining legal standards in the procurement of evidence.
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The specific rule in the field of searches and seizures was first laid down by
way of dictum some 60 years ago: that evidence should be excluded if it had
been illegaly seized.25 The audacity of the suggestion was perhaps partially
responsible for its slow acceptance. It was 28 years after its first mention that
the exclusionary rule was clearly enunciated by the Supreme Court,20 and in
the interim few states had discovered the existence of the principle, 27 despite
the fact that almost all of the constitutions included a search and seizure
clause.28 With the advent of prohibition, however, the illegal search cases
came thick and fast,29 the doctrine grew and developed limitations, 0 and
nearly half the states adopted it in one form or another. 81 Despite the vigorous
24. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
25. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (statute requiring production of
invoice of goods held by revenue officers, under penalty of forfeiture, held unconstitutional
under Fourth and Fifth Amendments). The Court went to great lengths to assert a con-
nection between the Fourth Amendment and the self-incriminating clause of the Fifth,
and declared that the facts here constituted unreasonable search and seizure, and that
evidence so "seized" was inadmissible. There appears no reason, however, why the case
could not have been decided on the self-incrimination clause alone. See concurring opinion,
116 U.S. at 638; Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seicures, 34 HARV. L. Rav, 361, 366
(1921) ; Note, 4 COL. L. Rzv. 60 (1904). Apparently the first case to hold that evidence
illegally seized, as distinguished from compelled in testimony, was inadmissible, was
United States v. Wong Quong Wong, 94 Fed. 832 (D. Vt. 1899) which, on very different
facts, cited the Boyd case as authority for the holding. Prior to the Boyd case, the law
had been well settled, stemming in this country, apparently, from Commonwealth v. Dana,
2 Metc. (Mass.) 329 (1841), that the method of procurement of evidence did not affect
its admissibility.
26. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
27. Apparently the first state to adopt the still embryonic federal rule was Vermont,
State v. Slamon, 73 Vt. 212, 50 At. 1097 (1901), but it quickly distinguished the rule
away. State v. Krinski, 78 Vt. 162, 62 AtI. 37 (1905). The courts of a few other states
soon adopted the rule, citing the Boyd case. Fraenkel, supra note 25, at 368, n. 43,
28. The state provisions as of 1930 are collected in CORNELIUS, Op. Cit. sUPra note 1,
at 8. At that time 47 of the states included a search and seizures provision in their con-
stitution or bill of rights. Only New York had a mere statutory provision, but its
constitution was amended in 1938 to include the clause. N.Y. CoNsT. ART. I, § 12.
29. CoRNzuus, op. cit. supra note 1, preface; Comment, The Meaning of the Federal
Rule on Evidence Illegally Obtained, 36 YALE L. J. 536, 537 (1927).
30. The device of exclusion was early extended to evidence acquired as a result of
knowledge gained by a previous illegal search, in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920). Generally, as to the growth of the rule and the develop-
ment of exceptions thereto, see Grant, Circumventing the Fourth Amendment, 14 So.
CALIF. L. REv. 359 (1941). See pp. 153-60 infra.
31. Nineteen states have adopted the rule (Fla., Idaho, Ill., Ind., Ky., Mich., Miss,
Mo., Mont., Ohio, Okla., Ore., S.D., Tenn., Tex., Wash., W. Va., Wis., Wyo,) while
twenty-six have rejected it (Ala., Ark., Cal., Colo., Conn., Del., Ga., Iowa, Kan., La., Mo,
[Vol, 58: 144
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protests of a sizable proportion of the commentators, 32 the exclusionary rule
must be regarded, at least as to the federal courts, as ineradicable law.
Of the possible explanations for the rule, the simplest and best seems to
be that the searches and seizures clauses require it, if the granted immunity
is to be in fact enjoyed. 33 The necessity which mothered the rule was the wide-
spread practice of illegal search, untrammeled as it was by existing legal or
social restraints.3 4 Then and in recent years civil suits for damages have sel-
dom been undertaken even by innocent search victims, for the same reasons
which militate against the recovery of persons injured by any other police
illegality. Despite the ineffectiveness of civil suit,35 governments have generally
failed to provide an effective statutory remedy for the search victim,o and have
Mass., Minn., Neb., Nev., N.C., N.D., N.H., N.J., N.M., N.Y., Pa., S.C., Utah, Vt, Va.).
One state, Maryland, has virtually rejected the rule, while another, Rhode Island, is
indefinite, and the last, Arizona, has reserved the question. See 1 WHno-;, Evmmcc
in CRIMINAL CASES, §373 (11th ed. 1935); 8 WiGmoRE, Evmru.:c, §2183 (3d ed. 1940).
32. It is contended against the rule that it succeeds in punishing neither the guilty
defendant nor the guilty searcher, see pp. 160-3 infra, while those favoring the rule in
effect confess, and avoiding say that the Fourth Amendment is meaningless without it.
The most complete argument against the rule is given in Plumb, supra note 3, at
370-385. Among other arguments opposed are 8 WViamosr, op. cit. supra, note 31,
§§ 2183-4; WOOD AND WAITE, CRIUM AND ITS TREAT .-T 390-94 (1941); Harnp,
Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Sciure, 19 ILL. L REv. 303 (1925); Kno.,
Self Incrimination, 74 U. OF PA. L. R~v. 139 (1925); Waite, Police Regulations by
Rules of Evidence, 42 MicH. L. REv. 679 (1944). Some of the principal arguments for
the rule are found in CoRNELIus, op. cit. supra note 1, at 39-46; Atkinson, Adwissilbily
of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 25 Ct. L RE'v. 11
(1925); Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrinination Clause, 29
MicH. L. REv. 1, 191 (1930) ; Chafee, The Progress of the Law, 35 HAnev. L. REV. 673,
694-704 (1922).
33. "If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring
his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as
those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution." Weels
v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 393 (1914).
34. "Once more we confront a rule disturbingly indicating failure of official discipline.
Once more the courts have failed to discover adequate direct process for control of
lawless enforcement of the law." MAG=UIE, EvDENcE: Couo,. SE.su.-D CoiM aw.
LAw 124-5 (1947).
35. No American case has been found in which large damages have been awarded for
illegal search alone. The judge himself may suggest the award of only nominal damages.
See Fennemore v. Armstrong, 29 Del. 35, 96 Atl. 204 (1915). It is not unusual to make
significant the amount claimed by demanding punitive damages. See Simpson v.
McCaffrey, 13 Ohio 508 (1845) ; Gamble v. Keyes, 35 S. D. 644, 153 N.W. 883 (1915).
And see Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts, 43 Cox. L. RV. 967, 977-S
(1943) suggesting punitive damages for an "exceptional wrong" of this type. Even
-violence is not likely to enlarge damages, unless the injury caused is itself serious. See
Caffini v. Hermann, 112 Me. 282, 91 Atl. 1009 (1914). And see Chafee, stapra note 32,
at 695.
36. See note 13 supra.
Whether the Federal Torts Claims Act provides a remedy for illegal search by
1948]
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uniformly failed to prosecute the wrongdoers.3 7 Thus the exclusionary rule's
specific purpose is to furnish a needed deterrent to illegal search not other-
wise provided by law.38
Federal officers is not yet decided by a case holding, but there is one clear dictum to the
effect that it does not. See Bell v. Hood, 71 F: Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947) (action against
federal officers qua individuals, alleging illegal search and seizure beyond authority of
office; court held that the Fourth Amendment could only apply to federal government
and its agents acting as such, and defendants not liable as individuals). The court
moreover stated that defendants could not be sued as federal officers, the federal govern-
ment not having consented to suit, in view of § 421(h) of the Act, 60 Stat. 845 (1946), 28
U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1948), which exempts "[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false
imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, mis-
representation, deceit, or interference with contract rights." A similar view as to this
section's effect on illegal search claims seems to be implicit in Gottlieb, The Federal
Tort Claimns Act-A Statutory Interpretation, 35 GEo. L. J. 1, 49-50 (1946) : "These ex-
ceptions are in accord with the exclusion of punitive damages under § 410(a) of the Act
and together show the intent of Congress to exclude cases involving malicious and wilful
torts from the pattern of this remedial legislation." Even were illegal search not charac-
terized as a malicious or deliberate tort, there might not be liability. § 421 (a) of the Act,
60 Stat. 845 (1946), 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1948), withholds jurisdiction to consider "Any
claim . . . based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform
a discretionary function or duty . . . whether or not the discretion involved be abused."
Thus to the extent that illegal search is treated as an abuse of discretion, there can be no
recovery. The section is thus commented upon in Gellhorn and Schenek, Tort Actions
Against the Federal Government, 47 CoL. L. Rxv. 722, 729 (1947): "The same policy
considerations which argue against imposing personal liability upon an officer were
apparently persuasive that the Government should also be free from liability for mistakcn
or even abusive exercises of judgment." It thus appears likely that most, if not all, illegal
searches will be held not to create federal liability under the Act.
37. To some extent the lack of prosecutions in the states may derive from doubt as
to whether illegal search constitutes a punishable crime. See State v. Leathers, 31 Ark.
44 (1876) (demurrer to indictment for search without warrant where there was no
forcible entry held properly sustained because no statute defined the act as a crime) ; State
v. Wagstaff, 115 S.C. 198, 105 S.E. 283 (1920) (defendants forcibly took satchel and
searched it; conviction of simple assault and battery-not illegal search-sustained). But
federal officers, though long restricted by a specific statute, have apparently never yet
been prosecuted. See Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
CORNELIUS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 45, declares: "[T]he writer has yet to learn of a single
instance where either a state or federal officer has been prosecuted criminally for an
illegal search and seizure, although extended inquiry has been made and illegal searches
are common." And see Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire Tapping, 32 CoRN. L. Q. 514, 553
(1947). And see note 14, supra.
38. The rule might be and sometimes has been identified with the catch-all principle
of "clean hands." See dissents of Justices Holmes and Brandeis in Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 470, 483-5 (1928). It has been suggested that the interest of
"Justice" itself must be "vindicated" by the exclusion of evidence illegally gotten. See
GLUECK, CRIME AND JUsTIcE 74 (1936). More specifically, it has been asserted that
government is "the omnipresent teacher" and therefore that all branches of government,
including the courts, must neither indulge in nor condone lawlessness in law enforcement,
on pain of "terrible retribution" from the people. See Brandeis, J., dissenting in the
Olmstead case, supra. But it seems possible to be still more specific. To the great mass
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Although the courts might easily have articulated the rule so as to accord
with its clear purpose, they seem from the outset to have been but dimly
aware of its function and to have confused it too easily with unrelated doc-
trine. In particular, the doctrinal notion has grown that the rule resembles
relief awarded to the defendants in a tort counterclaim against the prosecut-
ing government.39 The question on which admissibility depends is cast in the
vocabulary of tort law: Did an "officer of our government" commit an "act
of trespass" on "defendant's property"? The rule is said to provide a personal
"protection" for the victim against illegal search, or, more precisely, to pro-
vide a "remedy."40
The inconsistencies involved in the counterclaim concept of the rule are
readily apparent. Since the rule is invoked only after the search has taken
place, it cannot be said to "protect" the defendant from the illegal act itself;
it can provide protection only from deserved conviction upon the evidence
seized. Defendant thus is protected not from the wrongs of others, but against
the just consequences of his own wrong.
If, on the other hand, exclusion is sought to be justified as a remedy, to
compensate the defendant for the prior trespass, the objection first presents
itself that the remedy does not become the wrong. Only fortuitously, more-
over, is it related to the gravity of the wrong. In the many cases when the
of people the police, not the courts, are "the law," the teachers, and, in some cases, the
tyrants. It is not the decisions of the courts per se, but their effect on police methods,
which seems most likely to affect the everyday lives of citizens and their attitude towards
law. Rather than excluding evidence on some vague theory of "clean hands," with its
attendant doctrine developed in other fields of law, courts might better consider the rule
specifically as a deterrent.
The rule might be, but never has been, doctrinally explained as an outgrowth of con-
ceptions of an individual's right to due process. If it were construed as required by the
Federal Constitution's due process clause, however, the Fourteenth Amendment would
require not only the rule, but a uniformity of standards as to what constituted legal search.
Since the efficiency and discipline of state police forces is highly variable, see Stone, The
Control and Discipline of Police Forces, 146 ANNALS 63 (1929), uniform standards in
this area might be undesirable.
39. See WnARTo r, op. cit. s-upra note 31, §§ 374-5; 8 \, Icnom, op. cit. supra note
31, § 2184a. Vigmore, although recognizing the nature of the rule in discussing it among
other "Rules of Extrinsic Policy" nevertheless criticizes it as an attempt to try a collateral
cause of action. Id. § 2183.
40. The view is thus concisely stated by judge Learned Hand in Connolly v. Medalie,
58 F.2d 629, 630 (2d Cir. 1932) : "The power to suppress the use of evidence unlawfully
obtained is a corollary of the power to regain it. The prosecution is forbidden to profit
by a wrong whose remedies are inadequate for the injury, unless they include protection
against any use of the property seized as a means to conviction. The relief being thus
remedial, the evidence has never been thought incompetent against anyone but the victim.
Conceivably it might have been; it might have been held that the prosecution, though not
disqualified from taking advantage of another's wrong. .. should not profit in any wise
by its own. But that would obviously introduce other than remedial considerations; the
doctrine would then be like that of equity which denies its remedies to one who is not
himself scathless."
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search victim is not prosecuted, the "remedy" will not be available at all. If
he is prosecuted and is innocent, the "remedy" is worthless. If he is guilty
and is convicted, where the tainted evidence is insignificant, the victim gains
nothing from his "remedy." Where he is guilty and exclusion of the illegal
evidence secures his acquittal, the remedy-as in a murder trial-may be out
of all proportion to the injury suffered.
The immunity given to the search victim, if rationalized as a protection or
remedy designed for his benefit, rather than as a broad rule of public policy,
thus amounts to unmerited partiality, unjustified by any extrinsic policy.41
Nevertheless, the courts have followed the counterclaim concept of the rule,
and largely because of its influence have developed two major exceptions4 2
to the principle that evidence illegally seized is inadmissible.
The first of these, which may be termed the personal interest exception, is
that the rule's protection may be claimed only by a person "aggrieved" by
illegal seizure.43 Only one whose constitutional rights have been invaded is
said to be entitled to "complain" ;44 the privilege of suppressing evidence is
said to be "personal" ;45 and suppression is likened to a "remedy" for the vic-
tim of the search, not to be sought by others.40 Secondly, the rule is held
41. The following bitter passage has frequently been quoted, as descriptive of the
effect of the rule: "Titus, you have been found guilty of conducting a lottery; Flavius,
you have confessedly violated the constitution. Titus ought to suffer imprisonment for
crime, and Flavius for contempt. But no I We shall let you both go free, We shall not
punish Flavius directly, but shall do so by reversing Titus' conviction. This is our way
of teaching people like Flavius to behave, and of teaching people like Titus to behave, and
incidentally of securing respect for the Constitution. Our way of upholding the Constitu-
tion is not to strike at the man who breaks it, but to let off somebody else who broke
something else." 8 WiGmoRz, op. cit. supra note 31, at 40.
42. Properly speaking, there are no exceptions to the exclusionary rule other than
the two described in the text above. There is a time requirement as to when the motion
to suppress must be made, see WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 31, § 376, which is sometimes
confusingly termed an exception. Certain commentators, notably Wigmore, list as
"exceptions" to the rule various concepts concerning the legality of the search. Sce
WiGmoRE, op. cit. supra note 31, § 2184a. The latter confusion is noted inlra, pp. 161-2.
43. See Kelley v. United States, 61 F.2d 843, 845 (8th Cir. 1932). This is the word
used to codify the limitation in Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
54 STAT. 688 (1940), 18 U.S.C. § 687 (1946). But see note 48 infra. For collections of
cases on the limitation, see 78 A.L.R. 343 (1932) ; CoRNELUs, op. cit. supra note 1, at 54-8;
WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 31, § 374; Grant, supra note 30, at 368-9. The first case in-
yolving an illegal search in which the limitation was applied apparently was Moy Wing
Sun v. Prentis, 234 Fed. 24 (7th Cir. 1916), although the limitation had previously arisen
in cases involving subpoenas duces tecum. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). See note
54 infra.
44. See Ingram v. United States, 113 F.2d 966, 968 (9th Cir. 1940).
45. Penrod v. State, 38 Okla. Crim. Rep. 46, 49, 258 Pac. 1052, 1053 (1927); Con-
NELIUS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 57.
46. See Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629, 630 (2d Cir. 1932). Where defendants made
no claim to ownership of the premises searched or the property seized, the court de-
clared: "... . [I]n the absence of such a claim they are in no position to raise the ob-
jection that the search was unreasonable or unauthorized, or that their constitutional
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inapplicable if the evidence has been seized by persons other than officials of
the prosecuting government, and without their prior encouragement.A1 Both
limitations on the exclusionary rule are almost universally accepted in the
federal courts45 and in those state courts where the rule is in force.4
rights were invaded." See Lewis v. United States, 6-F. 2d 222, 223 (9th Cir. 1925).
"One malefactor may not claim the right to escape by reason of the fact that the con-
stitutional rights of another were violated." Holt v. United States, 42 F.2d 103, 105
(6th Cir. 1930), quoted with approval in Kelley v. United States, 61 F.2d 843, 846 (Sth
Cir. 1932).
47. CoaxLius, op. cit. supra note 1, at 50-67; 1 WHArTO.N;, op. cit. m1pra note 31,
§ 375. See also cases cited in notes 65-8 infra.
48. In cases of actual illegal search, the personal interest limitation has never ben
specifically upheld by the Supreme Court, although the point was virtually ruled upon in
Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942), which vas, however, a wiretapping
case, not one under the Fourth Amendment. Apparently accepting tacitly the personal
interest limitation, five justices held that a similar limitation applied a forliori where the
evidence was used merely to induce a witness to turn state's evidence, and the illegality
was statutory rather than a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 316 U.S. at 121. The
lack of precedent was thus made, by a bootstrap process, to strengthen, rather than
weaken, the case for the limitation. Three justices dissented, saying that the limitation
should not apply to the Federal Communications Act, and, further, questioning the sound-
ness of the limitation in any context. 316 U.S. at 127. Of the present members of the
court three (Black, Reed and Douglas) apparently favored the limitation, while two
(Mlurphy and Frankfurter) opposed it.
See, as to cases involving subpoenas duces tecum, note 54, infra.
The circuit courts have unanimously upheld the limitation in the following cases:
2d Cir.: United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631 (1946) ; 3d Cir.: Chepo
v. United States, 46 F.2d 70 (1930); 4th Cir.: Chicco v. United States, 284 Fed. 434
(1922); 5th Cir.: Cantrell v. United States, 15 F.2d 953 (1926); 6th Cir.: Holt v.
United States, 42 F.2d 103 (1930) ; 7th Cir.: Haywood v. United States, 26S Fed. 795
(1920) ; 8th Cir.: Kelley v. United States, 61 F.2d 843 (1932) ; 9th Cir.: Ingraham v.
United States, 113 F.2d 966 (1940) ; 10th Cir.: McShann v. United States, 33 F.2d 635
(1930). 1st Cir.: See Klein v. United States, 14 F.2d 35, 36 (1926).
A recent attempt to oust the well-entrenched personal interest limitation has ap-
parently failed. Rule 41(e) of the new Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, see note
43 supra, provides: "If the motion [for return and suppression of evidence by the ag-
grieved person] is granted the property shall be restored unless otherwise subject to law-
ful detention and it shall not be admissible at an.' hearing or trial' [Italics added]. The
wording could be taken to mean that once a motion is successfully made by the owner of
the seized property, the non-owner would also be protected. However, the drafting com-
mittee had specified in the footnote to the rule that "this rule is a codification of existing
law and practice," and had so indicated in various articles interpreting the rules. See
Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Proccdurc: II, 56 Y,&rm L. J. 197, 243
(1947) ; Holtzoff, The New Federal Criminal Procedure, 37 J. Cxa.. L & Cnrn.oLooY
111 (1946) ; Orfield, The Federal Rides of Criminal Procedure, 21 N.Y.U.LQ. RLv. 167,
209 (1946). As between the wording and the apparent intent of the drafters, two district
courts in the third circuit relied on the wording, and determined that under the rule,
illegally seized evidence was "tainted" and could not be used against even a person who
was not aggrieved. United States v. janitz, 6 F. R. D. 1 (D.N.J. 1946) ; United States
v. Dugan & McNamara, 16 L. W rEEK. 2290 (1947). Contra: Lagow v. United States,
159 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1946). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however, has
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The doctrinal rationalizations for the personal interest limitation, frequently
attacked by the commentators,"0 are far from convincing. Since the rule was
early based on the joint foundation of the Fourth Amendment and the self-
incrimination clause of the Fifth,51 its protection was said to be limited to the
accused5 2 There appears, however, no reason why a rule designed to enforce
an immunity against the search should depend on provisions other than the
search and seizures clause, nor any reason why the self-incrimination privilege,
which by definition can only be personal, should be engrafted to limit the
enforcement device of a basically broad immunity. That it is not necessary to
read the Fifth Amendment into the Fourth to justify the rule is evidenced by
cases involving corporations. Corporations are protected by the rule, 3 al-
though they are not protected by the privilege at all :64 thus in corporate cases
recently indicated its agreement with the Second Circuit, by citing the Lagow case with
apparent approval, on an appeal of the Janitz case on a procedural point. See United
States v. Janitz, 161 F.2d 19, 21 n. (3d Cir. 1947). Thus, in the two circuits in which the
point has been raised it is apparent that Rule 41 (e) will not alter the limitation.
The second major limitation on the exclusionary rule has been developed by tile
Supreme Court itself and thus is universal in the federal courts. See Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not excluded) ;
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (evidence illegally seized by private
individuals not excluded).
49. See sources, notes 42 and 43 supra. Illustrative are: Personal Interest Limtilalion:
State v. Laundy, 103 Ore. 443, 204 Pac. 958 (1922) ; People v. Anscomb, 234 Mich. 203,
208 N.W. 45 (1926); Ragland v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 598, 265 S.W. 15 (1924);
Search by Third Parties: Kendall v. Commonwealth, 202 Ky. 169, 259 S.W. 71 (1924).
But cf. Lowry v. State, 276 Pac. 513 (Okla. Cr. 1929).
50. Grant, Constitutional Basis of the Rule Forbidding the Use of Illegally Seled
Evidence, 15 So. CALiF. L. Rav. 60 (1941) ; Harno, supra note 32; Wood, The Scope of
the Constitutional Immunity Against Searches and Seizures, 34 W. VA. L. Q. 1, 15 (1927).
51. "And we have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private books
and papers to be used as evidence against him is substantially different from compelling
him to be a witness against himself." Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).
The Fourth Amendment reads:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
The self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment reads:
"No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self.....
For a thorough criticism of the interdependence doctrine of the Boyd case, oil
historical and functional grounds, see WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 31, § 2264.
52. See Corwin, op. cit. supra note 32, at 16, 203.
53. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
54. Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 480 (1913). The scope of the rule as it
applied to corporations had been thoroughly examined for the first time in Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43 (1906), which involved a subpoena duces tecum directed to an officer of a
corporation. In the course of the opinion the court stated 1) that a corporation was
subject not only to the visitatorial powers of the state but to the investigation, by subpoena
or otherwise, of the federal government; 2) that a corporation could not object to a
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the rule stands on the strength of the search immunity alone. There seems
to be no doctrinal justification for the double standard.
The illogic of limiting the exclusionary protection to the "aggrieved" party
appears in a pattern of inequitable decisions. Where, for example, a con-
spiracy exists in which one member of a gang owns property used by all, the
owner, frequently the master criminal, may go free, while his helpers are
punished.5 Where the papers of a corporation or association are illegally
seized, the organization may claim its property, but neither stockholders,O
officers 0 7 employees05 or membersP9 are personally entitled to invoke the rule,
subpoena on the basis of the self-incrimination privilege, since the latter was meant to be
personal; 3) but that a subpoena might constitute an unreasonable search and thus a
corporation might validly refuse compliance with it under the Fourth Amendment;
4) that a corporate officer could not object on the grounds that compliance would
personally incriminate him. Apparently none of the four propositions had been clearly
established prior to the Hale case.
Thus, in this type of case, the self-incrimination privilege was in actuality taken
away from the individual, for whom it was originally intended, and in effect given (by
means of the exclusionary rule) to corporations, for which it was not. See Justice
McKenna, dissenting, in Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 3M6 (1911). This con-
struction has since been followed. Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478 (1913);
Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 151 (1923); United States v. B. Goedde & Co.,
40 F. Supp. 523 (E.D. Ill. 1941).
The doctrine that corporations, like natural persons, are protected by the Fourth
Amendment, has been primarily significant in the field of government regulation of
business, by providing a restriction on the permissible scope of the subpoena. The function
of the exclusionary rule in these cases-that of limiting legislative power-is w.,holly
different from its function in cases of actual illegal search-that of controlling police
illegality. Nor does the permissible scope of the subpoena power bear any relation to
the permissible scope of actual search, although a contrary notion has been expressed.
See Braden, The Search for Objectizit, in Constitutional Law, 57 YALE L. J. 571, 578
(1948). And see, generally, Lilienthal, The Power of Gozernmen tal Agencies to Compel
Testimony, 39 HIAiv. L. REv. 694 (1926).
55. See Remus v. United States, 291 Fed. 501 (6th Cir. 1923) (among seven co-
defendants, one who owned property seized waived his objection to its admission in
evidence; other co-defendants held not entitled to object on theory that only the owner
could do so) ; Kelley v. United States, 61 F. 2d 843 (Sth Cir. 1932) (defendant who had
bootleg liquor in his custody as an employee of owner of premises %,hen illegal search
took place held not entitled to object to admission of evidence thus seized). But cf.
Alvau v. United States, 33 F2d 467 (9th Cir. 1929) (employee domiciled in owner's
residence held entitled to join in motion to suppress).
56. Bilodeau v. United States, 14 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S.
737 (1926) ; United States v. De Vasto, 52 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1931). Here the o,ner of
the evidence is held to be the corporation, and although the stockholders owm the corpo-
ration, the corporate veil cannot be pierced; only the corporation may object.
57. A. Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. v. United States, 3 F2d 786 (3d. Cir. 1925), cert.
denied, 26S U.S. 688 (1925) (corporation's president and director cannot object).
58. Holt v. United States, 42 F2d 103 (6th Cir. 1930) (corporate agent in charge
of trucking could not complain of illegal search of truck).
59. Haywood v. United States, 263 Fed. 795 (7th Cir. 1920), ccrt. denied, 256 U.S.
689 (1921). See State v. Laundy, 103 Ore. 443, 204 Pac. 958 (1922).
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although only they can be said to have suffered, in any meaningful sense, an
undue invasion of privacy.
But the most serious effect of the personal interest limitation-on a rule
which is primarily designed to strike at the practice of illegal search-is its
weakening of the judicial object lesson to investigative personnel. At present,
if police in walking down a hotel corridor smell opium through a transom, and
thereupon knock on the door, arrest the occupant and seize the opium, their
action is held illegal for lack of a warrant and the evidence is inadmissible ;10
on the other hand, if police, in order to reach defendant's room, break into a
boarding house, unwarrantedly search a series of rooms and finally, on reach-
ing the defendant's room, act in what is declared to be a legal manner, their
previous actions will not cause exclusion of the evidence seized. 01 To the ex-
tent that the police and the prosecutors are familiar with the rule, they will
then know that they may rummage everywhere for evidence concerning a
suspect except among his belongings or in his house. No motion to suppress
at the trial stage need be feared, there being no one who can successfully make
the motion.62 And without accurate awareness of the technical doctrine in-
volved, police may interpret judicial application of this limitation as a green
light to further improper conduct.
The second major limitation to the exclusionary rule, that it may not be
invoked where illegal search is made by persons other than the officials of the
prosecuting government,6 3 rests on the limited applicability of the constitu-
tions and on the basic concept of sovereignty. The several constitutional pro-
visions of the federal government and the states dealing with searches and
seizures protect citizens only against actions by the particular government or
its agents. 6 4 The courts, therefore, are said to have no power to protect the
people against illegal searches of other agencies, or to censure or nullify those
acts. 5
60, Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
61. McDonald v. United States, 166 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
62. Fraenkel, supra note 25, at 375, was perhaps the first commentator to condemn
the limitation on this ground: "This last ruling [referring to Haywood v. United States,
268 Fed. 795 (7th Cir. 1920)], it is submitted, is at variance with both the lqtter and
spirit of the Constitution, as it ignores the security given to the papers and effects as well
as the houses of the people, and because it permits the Government to benefit by Illegal
search so long as it is careful not to take property from the possession of Its owners."
It has also been observed that the requirement that a defendant must allege and prove
ownership of the seized property in order to move to suppress, United States v. Edelson,
83 F. 2d 404, 406 (2d Cir. 1936), means, in practice, that many defendants dare not so
move when the illegality of the search is in any doubt. See Grant, supra note 30, at 370.
Although it may be supportable that the defendant should be in the dilemma of having
to confess ownership or waive the rule's protection, the requirement-a procedural
implementation of the personal interest limitation-helps further to reduce the net effect
of the rule on police action.
63. See note 47 supra.
64. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Peters 243 (U.S. 1833).
65. "The record shows that what [the policeman] did by way of arrest and search
[Vol. 58: 144
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ILLEGAL SEARCH
But the question remains as to what official acts of the prosecuting govern-
ment are of such legal significance as to involve the government in the viola-
tion of the search immunity. The rule might perhaps be called into play only
when the particular government's officials actually conducted the search; on
the other hand, it might be invoked whenever such officials acted in such a
way as to encourage illegal search by others. The line drawn by the courts,
however, is somewhere in between. If the officers cooperate in the searchc" or
instigate it by a prior agreement even of a generalized naturey the evidence
seized may be suppressed; if they merely make a practice of using evidence
so discovered by others even if such practice is in fact well Imown, their ac-
tions are legally irreproachable.0 8 The criterion is thus whether official en-
couragement of illegality has taken place before or after the particular search.
Where in fact illicit searches are regularly and reciprocally made by various
agencies and their fruits consistently delivered for use in prosecution to other
agencies,6 9 the distinction becomes non-existent. Routine acceptance and use
of tainted evidence secured by another agency encourages illegal search to the
same extent as would a prior agreement.70
On doctrinal and practical grounds, which here seem to merge, the choice
before the courts is between forbidding their officials to do the actual work
of illegal search and forbidding them to link themselves to the chain of il-
legalities. The first alternative hardly enforces the constitutional immunity,
for the police can always rely on others to commit the physical act of tres-
pass.7 1 The second choice, by forbidding official use of illegally seized evi-
and seizure was done before the finding of the indictment in the Federal Court, under
what supposed right or authority does not appear. What remedies the defendant may
have against them we need not inquire, as the Fourth Amendment is not directed to
individual misconduct of such officials. Its limitation reaches the Federal Government
and its agencies." Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 333, 393 (1914).
66. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
67. Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927); U. S. v. Falloco, 277 Fed. 75
(W.D. 'Mo. 1922).
68. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); Kendall v. Commonwealth, 202 Ky.
169, 259 S.W. 71 (1924). See Black, supra note 8.
69. "In dozens of cases in my own experience as a Federal prosecutor we had to rely
on the evidence procured by the unhampered police of the State of New York, or impor-
tant criminals would have gone free." Statement of Thomas E. Dewey, in 1 Nuw Yo~nx
CONSTIUTIONAL CovENoN, REviSu REcoRD 372 (1938).
70. "We exalt form above substance when we hold that the use is made lav.ful because
the intruder is without a badge of office." Cardozo, J., in People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13,
22, 150 N.E. 585, 588 (1926).
"If [the Government] pays its officers for hazing got evidence by crime I do not see
why it may not as well pay them getting it in the same way, and I can attacl no impor-
tance to protestations of disapproval if it knowingly accepts and pays and announces that
in the future it will pay for the fruits." (Italics added). Holmes, J., dissenting in Olin-
stead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928).
71. With the police of other governments, long practice may establish a system of
reciprocal favors. If aid of private individuals is desired, the system depends on suitable
compensation as with the system of informers in the field of arrest. In particular cases,
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dence, would place a direct responsibility on police to investigate by legal
methods and would thus effectuate the overriding purpose of the immunity,
Apparently the one satisfactory explanation for the distinction presently
made by the courts is the doctrinal one that again they are formulating the
exclusionary device as a collateral cause of action, rather than viewing it in
terms of the rule's function. A tort action for trespass would presumably
fail at the point where it became impossible to show that the searcher was the
agent of the government for commission of the particular tort.72 Where a
prior agreement could be shown, agency would be established; where there
was mere acceptance of the fruits of the search, it would perhaps be difficult
to establish agency and thereby bind the actual principal. By the same token
the exclusionary rule in its present posture requires, in effect, a showing of
an agency relationship between government and searcher. If, however, the
courts were to view their exclusionary invention as a method of reinforcing
a constitutionally guaranteed immunity free of unrelated doctrine, the rule
could be as broad as required for its purpose.73
If legality is to be enforced by means of the rule, it is clear that its two
chief exceptions must be eliminated. As long as police may evade the rule
when evidence against a suspect is available among the belongings of third
parties, or through the help of third parties, and as long as no other effective
deterrent exists, the practice of illegal search will flourish despite judicial
condemnation, and despite the existence of the ruleY4
THE RULE AS A COURT ENFORCEMENT DEVICE
Although full orientation of the exclusionary rule to the prevention of il-
legal search would be highly desirable if the rule be retained, it is far from
generally conceded that the exclusionary device as such represents the most
effective available deterrent. The searching criticisms and defenses of the
where sections of the public feel that their interests are at stake they may cooperate with
police as vigilantes, rather than employees. See note 8 mipra.
72. For an example of a court's use of the agency analogy, see U. S. v. Falloco, 277
Fed. 75 (1922).
73. A prohibition on use of evidence illegally seized in another jurisdiction might be
grounded on general notions of fairness or public policy. See Brandeis, J., dissenting in
Burdeau v. McDowall, 256 U.S. 465, 477 (1921). If the acceptance of the evidence by
officials of the prosecuting government is to be deterred as undue encouragement of
illegality, however, there appears no reason why exclusion should not be based simply on
the fact of acceptance.
74. It has been estimated that during a seven-year period (1920-1927), in 290 of 490
federal illegal search cases involving liquor, evidence was admitted under exceptions to
the rule. See Comment, The Meaning of the Federal Rule on Evidence Illegally Obtained,
36 YALE L. J. 536, 537 n. (1927). The weakening effect of the exceptions was recognized
by many of the supporters of the federal rule when New York considered its adoption,
and the proposal was made to eliminate the rule's two major exceptions. See VI Nrw
YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMITTEE: SuB-CoMMITnE ON BILL OF
RIGHTS AND GENERAL WELFARE, PROBLEMS RELATING TO BILL OF RIGHTS AND GENERAL
WELFARE 215-220 (1938).
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rule by the courts and commentators, argued and reargued almost since its
inception, show a thoroughgoing disagreement as to the desirability and ef-
fectiveness of using the barrier of exclusion to stem police lawlessness.73
The criticisms of the enforcement mechanism chosen by the courts fall into
two general categories. In the first place, it is asserted that the rule, when it
operates at all, may free otherwise guilty men, thus hampering law, enforce-
ment and punishing an innocent public.70 In the second place, it is said that
since the rule does not operate to punish the lawless searcher, it is not an
effective deterrent to lawlessness.
The contention that the rule is bad because it operates to release the guilty
men is analytically neither more nor less than an argument that in criminal
investigation the end justifies the means. If the rule allows unmerited ac-
quittals, it does so only in the cases where the illegality is indispensable to the
conviction. An after-the-fact prohibition on use of the evidence prevents
convictions in no greater degree than would effective prior direction to police
to search only by legal means. Exclusion is restrictive only to the same e.-
tent as a high standard of police discipline. If too many criminals are ac-
quitted in court or released prior to trial because legal means of investigation
are required by the rule, it may well be concluded that the definition of legal
means is too rigid,7S or that the police are too lax or inefficient 70 to find legal
75. See note 32 supra.
76. Professor Waite has found that in a specified period in Detroit, one out of every
four guilty "gun-toters" was released because of the exclusion rule. See Waite, Public
Policy and thw Arrest of Felons, 31 MicH. L. REv. 749, 763-5 (1933). No estimate is
given as to the proportion of men thus released whose conviction might have been secured
by legal means.
77. "The natural way to do justice here would be to enforce the healthy principle of
the Fourth Amendment directly, i.e., by sending for the high-handed, over-zealous mar-
shal who had searched without a Warrant, imposing a thirty-day imprisonment for his
contempt of the Constitution and then proceeding to affirm the sentence of the convicted
criminal." 8 W Gmo-x, op. cit. supra note 31, § 2184.
78. Such, in fact, is the meat of almost every attempted criticism of the rule's effect
on law enforcement. See especially Waite, suipra note 32, at 6SS-7. And see articles cited
note 32 supra.
A strong case may be made to the effect that the present definition of "probable cause"
for a search warrant is not required by the Fourth Amendment. Marshall's definition of
"probable cause," that it . . . imports a seizure made under circumstances Which warrant
suspicion," Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch 339, 343 (U.S. 1813), is perhaps more sup-
portable than today's strict requirements. See Note, The Probable Cause Rcquirements for
Search Warrants, 46 HAgv. L. REv. 1397 (1933).
Perhaps in the search-without-warrant field there is also room for some relaxation of
standards. See WArE, CRImI-AL LAW mx Acriox 80-87 (1934) ; Ploscowe, Mcasres of
Constraint in European and Anglo-American Crindgzal Procedure, 23 GEo. L. J. 762,
793 (1935). And see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) : "The Fourth
Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search
and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as
well as the interests and rights of individual citizens."
The anti-exclusion rule position in this respect is summed up in WOD Aim W ,
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means of acquiring evidence. But the maintenance of existing standards by
means of exclusion is not open to attack unless it can be doubted whether
the standards themselves are necessary.
That the exclusionary device does not function to deter the individual
searcher is not proof of its inefficiency. The rule operates to hold the prose-
cutor and the police chief responsible for illegal search by their investigators,
and to punish them, in a real sense, by marring their record of convictions and
their reputation for effective and proper law enforcement.80 By consistently
bringing pressure to bear on top officials to discipline their own organizations,
exclusion might be more effective than an action against the guilty searcher,
which would seldom reach above the lower ranks. Since existing deterrents
which depend on prosecution and civil suit are ineffective, and since the courts
have no direct means of reaching individual offenders, a sanction against their
superiors seems at least a reasonable substitute for purposes of judicial ad-
ministration.81
The only alternative method of judicially controlling lawlessness which
seems within the courts' inherent powers, an extension of the contempt sanc-
tion to apply to deviating officials, appears at best inadequate. With the aid
of statutory authorization, it might be invoked against one seeking to intro-
duce illegally seized evidence,82 on the theory that he thereby affronted the
dignity of the court. But the threat of the sanction would discourage the use
op. cit. supra note 32, at 394: ". . . courts could mitigate the evils caused by their judge-
made rule that evidence obtained by unreasonable search cannot be used for the public
benefit, if they would but modify some of their opinions as to what is reasonable."
As to search without a warrant there is widespread disagreement as to what Is
"reasonable," opinions ranging from assertions that the founders meant all searches and
seizures without judicial authority to be unreasonable, see Frankfurter, J., dissenting in
Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 608 (1946), to suggestions that any search for
evidence, on grounds of common sense suspicion, should be reasonable. See Waite, Con-
ment, 42 MIcH. L. Rzv. 147 (1943). There is also basic disagreement as to what consti-
tutes "inspection" and what constitutes "search." Compare opinions of majority and
minority in the Davis case, stipra, and see Flint v. Stone Tracy, 220 U.S. 107 (1911);
FRE D, THE POLICE POWER 42 (1904). Further, there appears no clear definition of the
scope of reasonable search following legal arrest. Compare United States v. Lefkowltz,
285 U.S. 452 (1932) with Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), and see Hill, A
Recent Extension by the United States Supreme Court of the Doctrine of Incidental
Search, 38 J. CRIm. L. & CRImINOLOGY 244 (1947). See generally, Fraenkel, Recent De-
velopments in the Federal Law of Searches and Seicures, 33 IowA L. Rav. 472 (1948).
79. The range of abilities and aptitudes required of a modern policeman, and the
difficulties involved in recruiting and training men fitted for the job are well summarized
in VoU.MER, POLICE AND MODERN SOCIETY 216-237 (1936).
80. Fraenkel, supra note 25, at 372.
81. WOOD AND WAIrE, op. cit. supra note 32, at 393, flatly deny that the federal rule
has any beneficial effect at all. In fact, they say, the contrary is evident for police in
states without the rule are no worse behaved than those in states with it. Such a con-
clusion, however, supportable or not, proves little, for police are able to evade the present
rule through its exceptions in the states where it applies.
82. The suggestion was made in 8 WiGMoRE, op. cit. supra note 31, §2184,
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not only of tainted evidence, but all evidence whose procurement was of even
doubtful legality. The procedure would operate to free even more guilty
defendants than does the exclusionary rule, and would similarly fail directly
to punish the searching officer. If, on the other hand, the sanction were di-
rected to officers violating search warrant instructions, on the theory that the
violation was a contempt of court,83 the sanction would fall to include the
great majority of illegal search cases, in which no warrant is secured at all,
for these cases would never reach a court. Furthermore, the incentive would
be all the greater for neglecting to use the warrant.84
Thus, of the two methods available to the courts to control illegal search,
the exclusionary rule seems potentially the more effective.
Where illegally seized evidence is not intended to be used in court, the
seizure is, as in other cases of illegality not incident to prosecutionFe outside
the control of the court. Clearly no court rule of evidence is likely to deter
police from making such a search and seizure. In fact, as one commentator
has suggested, the strictness of the exclusionary rule may increase the in-
centive for this type of infraction.8 Certainly its existence is sufficiently
separate from a search for evidentiary purposes, and its practice sufficiently
widespread, to suggest the need for different treatment.
Since the essential devices of control needed for this type of police action
are investigative and prosecutive, it would appear that the courts might well
be supplied with an independent prosecuting arm to aid them. The function
of such an agency would be to seek out lawlessness in law enforcement, prose-
cute offenders, and thus bring offenses within the jurisdiction of the courts67
Its character as an agency independent of the usual investigative bodies might
be assured by allocating to the courts the power of appointing its members8 3
83. Contempt may of course be found wvhere a district attorney refuses to return
evidence on the court's order, see Wise v. Wills, 220 U.S. 549 (1911) and Vise v. Hen-
kel, 220 U.S. 556 (1911), but such a sanction is no different from other contempts for
disobeying court orders. There is no sanction thus imposed for the illegal search or
against the searcher.
84. For a brief discussion of the problems involved, including the constitutional one,
see Plumb, supra note 3, at 388-9. See, generally, as to the history and functions of civil
and criminal contempt, Comment, 57 YALE L. J. 83 (1947).
85. See note 20, supra.
86. Waite, supra note 32, at 685-8.
87. Professor Chafee suggested the creation of such agencies in his preface to
HoPINs, op. cit. mspra note 3.
The metaphor that the Constitution provides "both a shield and a sword" to protect
civil rights, see CALE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 1-32, and Kom=nz, THE: Coz1sTrunoN2 Al.D
CIviL RIGHTs (1947), might also be appropriately applied to protection of the public's
civil liberties against official lawlessness. If the courts can invent an enforcement device
to implement the Fourth Amendment, there seems no good reason why Congress could not
constitutionally establish prosecuting agencies. Certainly the states could do so.
88. Such agencies should not only be free of control by the usual investigative and
prosecutive bodies, but one step further removed from political taint. For the same
reasons, it has been suggested that public defenders be appointed by the courts. See
FIxAL REPORT or SAMIUEL SEABTIRY, supra note 17, at 219-22.
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In addition to extending the rule of law to police practices not incident to
prosecution the institution of efficient prosecuting agencies would, in effect, re-
place the exclusionary device in its own sphere, for the threat of an action
would forestall attempts to use unlawfully procured evidence. In the event of
an agency's laxity or abuse of its power however, the existence of the ex-
clusionary barrier would provide an alternative method of court governance
of investigative methods.
CONCLUSION
Until legislators see fit to assert control over the whole array of official
crimes by the creation of independent prosecuting bodies especially designed
to govern law enforcement methods, the exclusionary rule will serve a useful
purpose in its limited field. At least as to investigative illegalities, which must
pass review of the courts, the rule is potentially an effective deterrent. Formu-
lation of the rule in accord with its function would help fulfill a responsibility
which the courts themselves have at least temporarily assumed.
